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Abstract  
An experience of helplessness during the production of a collective autobiographical narrative 
offers an opportunity to explore points of convergence between Cavarero’s postural philosophy 
and Ettinger’s martixial borderlinking. The narrative is treated as a live scene which enfolds the 
movement of the drive conceptualized in such a way as to avoid the prioritization of death over 
life.  Five successive moves, inspired by Ettinger’s rotation of the phallic prism, illuminate 
affinities between the two thinkers. The first rotation explores the matrixial and relational 
qualities which com-pose the scene. The second rotation approaches death from a notional 
beginning, prioritising the presence of the mother and her dissymmetrical relationship to the 
infant. The third rotation emphasizes the transformational character of Ettinger’s matrixial 
movement and border-crossing, especially when examined in conjunction with Cavarero’s 
maternal inclination. In the fourth rotation we show how inclination (clinamen) in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis is linked to the disappearance of the mother from the scene. The (re)introduction 
of the mother disrupts the Lacanian logic with the possibility of a beginning just as immanent as 
desire and lack. Movement, qua embrace and unity-disunity (fifth rotation), becomes an 
indispensable component of feminist ontology which captures the immanence of sharing in the 
martixial-maternal plane. 
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Adriana Cavarero’s Relating Narratives (2000) offers a solid starting point for appreciating the 
importance of witnessing the other’s story and, in turn, having one’s story witnessed. Cavarero 
argues that autobiographical memory “always recounts a story that is incomplete from the 
beginning” (2000, 39), since memory is often factually untrustworthy (2000, 40). A refabulation 
by the other, then, may lend unity to one’s story. The desire for unity is an indirect plea to the 
other for recognition (2000, 42). To have one’s story told is to be recognized. In fact, we are so 
invested in the process of narrating our lives that it becomes an unconscious activity (King 2008, 
339). Yet, the desire to tell and receive the other’s story is fraught, as desire is often expressed in 
conjunction with verbal demands and phantasmatic investments, when, for example, in 
exchanging life stories, one exclaims: “I know exactly what you mean!”’, only to find that this 
recognition was but a subjective projection onto the other’s narration. All the same, sharing 
stories opens up a unique space. Bracha Ettinger conceptualizes such a space as one of 
witnessing and co-experiencing which accommodates not only desire(s) but various other 
psychic elements such as “jouissance, traumas, pictograms, phantasies, affects […] and channels 
death-drive oscillations, libidinal-erotic flows, [and] imprints and affected traces, conjointly but 
differently”’ (2000, 195). 
 
Ettinger’s work arises out a consistent feminist critique of Lacanian psychoanalytic orthodoxy 
and dispenses with the concept of the phallus, creating room for thinking feminine subjectivity in 
terms of co-production (co-poiesis) and sharing. Ettinger questions the phallic economy as the 
only outcome of the infant’s separation from the mother, as well as the Lacanian pronouncement 
that woman is ‘not-all’ and cannot be captured by the symbolic signifier. Even if we agree with 
Lacan, she notes, there is no reason to exclude the capacity to link with the Other from the 
symbolic domain or from a theorisation of feminine subjectivity. The first Other in Ettinger’s 
formulation is the mother. But even the most primordial experience of-with the mother is 
characterised by togetherness in difference. Even in the womb there is togetherness in separation.  
 
Drawing on togetherness in difference, Ettinger proposes the concept of the Matrix as a symbol 
supplementary to the phallus (Pollock, 2004, 11). The Matrix is defined as  
 
a sphere of a not-one-ness (more-than-one but not everything and/or less-than-one but not 
nothing), which includes a recognised unknown. [It] is composed of the known and the 
unknown; it is a meeting place for the co-emerging I and the not-I(s) which neither assimilated 
nor rejected (Ettinger, 2000, 197).  
 
The act of connecting with the other is called matrixial borderlinking, an ability as universal as 
separation and castration (Pollock 2004, 11). Matrixial borderlinking takes place at the margins 
of language and Ettinger clearly envisages it as “a space beyond the cogito” (Neill 2008). 
Matrixial borderlinking enables a process of metramorphosis <1>, a transformation taking place 
at borderlines and thresholds, between being and absence, memory and oblivion, I and not-I. 
(1992, 201). Significantly, consciousness is not excluded from this process. But metramorphic 
consciousness has no centre and does not attempt to hold a fixed gaze. It resides in or slides in 
and out of the realm of borderlines, margins and thresholds, transgressing the old and creating 
new ones (Ettinger, 1992, 201). It forms part of, or better is, co-poietic activity (Ettinger 2006, 
144).  
 
Dispensing with the phallus nods affirmatively in the direction of feminist theorists who do not 
subscribe to the psychoanalytic model. In the present case it provides common ground for a 
creative encounter between Cavarero and Ettinger as a way of opening Cavarero’s narrative 
concept of relating to the multiplicity of psychic elements potentially activated in matrixial 
borderlinking. Yet, the phallus is not the only ‘sticking’ point. In Inclinations (2016) Cavarero 
critiques Western philosophy for making death and the end of life the starting point from which 
thought and action are being examined, proposing the concept of natality as a life-affirmative 
alternative. Natality draws on Arendt’s concept of the beginning as ‘completely human’ (Martin, 
2002, 33) and is transformed by Cavarero to provide a pivotal term for feminist analysis in an 
articulation that is ‘unashamedly feminine’ (Martin, 2002, 35). It is an attempt to reposition 
death in relation to the implications of birth and beginning. However,  
 
Natality does not try to tame the prospect of death’s negativity by balancing it against 
something sweet and positive in birth […]. Rather, through its focus on birth, natality 
enables us to consider why death has been the issue, whether that is an issue that must be 
heroically overcome or endured, or inauthentically denied’ (Martin, 2002, 34).  
 
Using Leonardo da Vinci’s The Virgin and Child with St Anne as her visual referent, Cavarero 
also puts forward the inclining posture of the mother over the infant and the departure of her 
body from the vertical axis as an emblematic visual alternative to the phallic ‘uprightness’ 
(orthotes, connoting correctness) that inhabits masculine thought. Death does not have a place in 
Cavarero’s thought and that inevitably extends to the concept of the death drive in Freudian 
psychoanalysis. This incompatibility gives rise to an interesting question which can be 
articulated as follows.  
 
In Relating Narratives (2000) Cavarero argues that what we usually call the meaning of one’s 
life can only be determined in retrospect. To illustrate the point Cavarero refers to Karen 
Blixen’s story of the man who went out in his yard at night to investigate a noise. The man 
stumbles around in the dark, but the next morning sees that his footprints have traced the figure 
of a stork on the ground. For narrative scholars who draw on Cavarero “the shape of a life can 
only be a matter of interpretation, constructed in the very act of narrating or representing”, and 
the discovery of a final shape of one’s life is only possible from a position of hindsight (King 
2008, 341). However, the desire for unity and meaning can inadvertently give rise to the 
opposite, an experience of utter disunity, confusion and aporia. What happens in such cases? 
How can we theorise instances in which both me and my interlocutor, my friend, my other, find 
ourselves in such a predicament, when disunity and an intimation of death seem to get the better 
of us? 
 
For Ettinger sharing unpleasurable or painful experiences is directly linked to the fundamental 
human disposition of sharing traumas. Sharing traumas, she writes, includes, among other things, 
“overlapping circles of biographical fragments and chimes with the ‘ordinary’ transmission of 
cultural memories” (2004, 11). Moreover, and precisely because the resurfacing of a trauma 
entails a failure of meaning which often surprises and catches one unaware, sharing is directly 
linked to the raison d’ être of matrixial co-poiesis, during which the other will do for me what I 
cannot do for myself:  
 Since I cannot fully handle events that profoundly concern me, they fade-in-transformation 
while my non-I becomes wit(h)ness to them… In the matrixial psychic sphere, my imprints 
will be transcribed in the other, and to begin with in the m/Other [….]  Thus my others will 
process traumatic events for me, like my m/Other processed archaic events for my 
premature and fragile subjectivity (141).  
 
As in the case of Cavarero, we ask: how does my other process traumatic events for me whilst 
lending herself, her own story and her very presence, to events that neither of us can fully handle?  
 
The departure from phallic uprightness and the introduction of the non-phallic matrixial realm 
constitute plausible grounds for a convergence between Ettinger and Cavarero. More important, 
their respective theoretical formulations inhere a sense of movement (leaning, crossing 
thresholds, traversing) which adds vital dynamism to the spatial and already highly visual 
reconceptualization of the feminine. It is this dynamism, this very movement that we seek to 
further develop here, imagining the scene of the autobiographical encounter we will introduce in 
the next section as not just a site of narrative possibilities but as a live scene which reverberates 
with the physical proximity of bodies sitting close to one other, touching, interacting and co-
producing being over time. Could such a scene enfold, contain and ‘hold’ the death drive in such 
a way as to enrich the theorization of feminine subjectivities whilst avoiding the pitfalls of 
certain psychoanalytic approaches and the prioritization of death over life?  
 
Ettinger lists death drive oscillations among the components of the matrixial borderlinking 
(2000, 195) but does not dwell on the role of the drive in her theory. The uses of the death drive 
in Freudian and Lacanian theory are diverse, and a full account of these uses are beyond the 
remit of the present paper. Suffice it to say that feminist scholars have deployed the bifurcation 
of Eros and Thanatos and the subversive potential of the concepts of sadism and masochism to 
broaden the theorization of sexuality (Williams 1995, De Lauretis 2008). Others have tamed the 
death drive by focusing on the partial drive and its satisfaction via ordinary objects in everyday 
life (Copjec 2002).  
 
Movement is vital to the drive <2>. Here we draw on the death drive in two ways. First, as a 
circular, curving motion, a force that “bends space” harking back to a mode of satisfaction which 
does not attain its object by going straight for it but by encircling it, “go round in circles.” 
(Kingsbury, 2010, 529). This operation can be exemplified by any ‘pointless’ activity, like taking 
a stroll to the shops and coming back empty handed but content for having taken a walk <3>. 
Seen as a curving motion, the drive bears little resemblance to the vertical lines of classic 
(upright phallic) geometry Cavarero critiques in Inclinations.  
 
The second way in which we employ the drive draws on Jean Laplanche’s Life and Death in 
Psychoanalysis (1985). Laplanche offers a philosophical discussion of the drive, focusing on the 
derivation of the sexual drive from life sustaining operations, and of the death drive from the life 
drive as an exacerbation of the latter. Uncoupled from any reference to human subjects and 
honed to abstraction, the sexual drive (Eros) is said to arise through propping (étayage) onto life 
sustaining operations (1985, 15-16). The concept of propping pervades Laplanche’s monograph. 
In the final chapter of the book, the cross-section of the death drive and Eros is visually 
represented as the resting point of a U-shaped graph: death leaning on life; life leaning on death 
(1985, 124). Proximity and propping, Laplanche notes, evade the rigidity of the theoretical 
binarism which later beset Freudian orthodoxy (1985, 122). In that sense, the death drive is 
understood as being emplaced in motion, in a scene of live forces, in which Eros is defined as 
unity and the death drive inheres as conflict (or, we might say, disunity), taking the form of 
aggressiveness when directed not against another individual but against the subject itself 
(Laplanche, 1985, 87).  
 
It is such an experience of ‘deadly’ disunity, utter helplessness, vulnerability and self-aggressive 
conflict that we wish to capture in this paper, together with the spatial and verbal response to it 
by the other, linking both to matrixial sharing and maternal inclination. The narrative excerpt we 
discuss in the following section draws on a recorded session of a project on the dialogic co-
construction of meaning. It is an artwork of sorts, a co-created representation of a lived 
experience based on transcripts and enriched with comments and thoughts, subsequently turned 
into an anonymized collective text despite the use of ‘I’.  To paraphrase Cavarero, it is a tale 
(sjuzet) which is faithful to its story (fabula) (King 2008, 340). In the discussion that follows this 
tale is treated as a live scene, a tableau vivant com-posed of narrative and visual elements with 
duration and movement, a moving, unfolding scene the meaning of which resides in words as 
well as in gestures. On the theoretical level, it is a moving scene in the sense that our theoretical 
argument is borne out of successive displacements, each one taking theoretical reasoning to a 
slightly different direction.  
 
In Inclinations (2016), Cavarero invites the reader to change our register or reposition our gaze, 
trying to imagine ontology as a geometry of variable postures inside of which inclination may 
assume a modular role (2016, 128). In a similar manner, Ettinger speaks of the challenges in her 
own effort to move beyond Lacanian psychoanalytic orthodoxy by rotating the phallic prim “so 
as to open and articulate a distance in the Real that can be articulated in the Symbolic as 
knowledge, a breach in which we can glimpse the matrixial sphere beyond the phallus” (2006, 
139). One could extend this metaphor to say that the rotation of a prism always produces 
diffractions, iridescent lines of seeing differently, allowing something other than a masterful 
narrative to emerge: helplessness, vulnerability and the welcoming the traumas that inhere in 
trans-subjective communication, alongside the desire for unity.  
 
By reading Cavarero together with Ettinger we do not aim to produce contrived comparisons. 
The five successive rotations we develop below illuminate parallels and affinities between the 
two thinkers but also show how the former’s thought might reinforce the latter’s contribution to 
feminist philosophy via carefully revisiting and further critiquing the psychoanalytic-
philosophical premises from which she departs. Cavarero argues that postural philosophy does 
not deny the vertical model but exposes its limits (2016, 127). Once such limits have been 
exposed, we might add, we may meaningfully contemplate the reintegration of key concepts, like 
the death drive and its movement, into a maternally-matrixially oriented feminist philosophy.  
 
The first rotation focuses on the feeling of utter helplessness arising with the thought of ‘my 
death’ occurring unexpectedly during a friendly conversation and inviting an immediate response 
from my interlocutor. Drawing on the affective intensity of the event and the initial response by 
the other, we introduce the matrixial (for Ettinger) and relational (for Cavarero) elements which 
com-pose this exchange, as well as a clear distinction between the verbal demand for a response 
addressed to the other and the appeal for a matrixial inclination that goes well beyond the limits 
of language.  
 
The second rotation approaches the experience of death by reverting to a notional beginning, 
prioritising birth and focusing on the presence of the mother and her dissymmetrical relationship 
to the infant. By rethinking the importance of the maternal presence, Cavarero and Ettinger 
honor and exceed the theoretical postulates that underpin their work. The presence of and 
dissymmetry between the mother and the child challenge and critique Freud, Lacan and Arendt 
for regularly imagining the human subject not relationally and with reference to another subject, 
but in total isolation. The resulting shift in perspective further allows us to reconsider the 
movement of the drive as an element compatible with the feminist argument.  
 
The third rotation emphasizes the transformational and indeed inaugural nature of Ettinger’s 
theoretical formulation as a process of movement, border-crossing and traversal, especially when 
examined in conjunction with Cavarero’s concept of natality. We start the fourth rotation by 
seeking the place of inclination (clinamen) in Lacanian psychoanalysis, only to find that its rare 
use and eventual excision for the theoretical framework are linked to the disappearance of the 
mother from the scene. The (re)introduction of the mother disturbs and disrupts the Lacanian 
psychoanalytic logic with a gesture of curvature and the possibility of a beginning just as 
immanent as desire and lack. In that sense, we argue in the fifth rotation, movement, unity and 
disunity, is the live extension of inclination and co-poetic spatiality, an indispensable component 
of feminist ontology which best captures the im-materiality of sharing in the martixial-maternal 
scene.  
 
Sharing Stories: In the Hands of my Friends 
 
The following incident is a collective autobiographical fiction. It belongs to all the participants 
and to no one in particular. It is based on an event we all found exceptionally powerful in one of 
the sessions whilst exploring the discursive co-construction of meaning (see Gonick and Gannon, 
2014). Taking creative research methods to heart, we co-constructed this account from the raw 
materials of a recording on the themes of change, growing up in the 80s, memories of young 
sexuality and responsibility, relationship with our mothers, arriving in the UK and experiencing 
(non) Britishness. Picture the spatial setting of the recording: a small group of female academics 
in their forties and fifties, sitting in a circle in a university office. Narrative researchers draw 
attention to the rise of emotion during sharing narratives, adding that stories are most instructive 
when they are most personal or when the owners of the stories are most vulnerable (Watson 
2008). The strength of such an approach lies ‘in the opening up of possibilities rather than in the 
coming up with resolutions—possibilities that may in fact be subject to stormy weather, un-
smooth voyages, incompatible coordinates and flotation failure’ (ibid). Precise psychoanalytic 
interpretations of the piece below can be easily constructed but our aim is to abandon such a 
route in favor of proximities emerging with successive rotations.  
 
I remember my amusement at realizing that others had similar experiences as me; the woes of 
growing up as a girl in different cultures. Good mood around the room, and laughter. All 
mothers are the same when they say ‘you have to do the right thing’, whatever that ‘right thing’ 
might be. My friend says: “From the early age I knew I had a duty of responsibility of care. I 
knew what I was expected to do”. For me responsibility and care could only mean one thing, 
staying always from boys and preserving one’s ‘good name’. I am sure my friend means the 
same thing and I pipe up: ‘From a very early age, I had the impression that my mother did not 
trust me. I used to think, “Why are you always telling me to be careful? Why are you always 
telling me to be mindful my behavior?” My friend disagrees: “This is not what I meant. I meant 
caring for others, like a younger sibling, for example”.  
I don’t know why but I feel rebuffed, told off, chastised.  
We drift into talking more about our mothers, trying to explain maternal influences in feminist 
terms. Are we not the living symptoms of those women who were caught, like Persephone, 
between worlds, between semi-obsolete notions of duty and their modern aspirations? Are we not 
caught in the paradoxes of their admonitions and conflicting messages: succeed, but not too 
much; be ambitious, but not too much? We laugh and shake our heads. 
The discussion turns on loss. One of us says: “It’s like losing a piece of myself every time 
someone I love passes away”; and another: “I am not there for them, never”. This is when it hits 
me. I say this without thinking to: “Sometimes, in very dark moments, I think I am the dead one, 
for all the people we have left behind. I am the one who is missing”. As soon as I utter these 
words I feel exhausted, overwhelmed and catatonic. My friend, who is sitting next to me, notices 
my distress. She leans towards me, her shoulder touching mine, her body propping mine, gently 
pushing against mine. Then, she puts her arm around my shoulder and says quietly: 
“I know, I, too, feel guilty for missing from the lives of friends, my mum, and then, I adjust to the 
idea of missing. You know, I have to deal with it because if I start missing everything, then life is 
going be unbearable, miserable. But there are days when I feel really melancholic and depressed, 
because, you know, one is a foreigner forever, and you are on your own all the time”.  
After that, we remain silent for several seconds.  
 
 
First Rotation: Neither Absence nor Meaning 
 
Death excised from everyday life persists as the impossible thought of the outside <4> as my 
erasure from the scene. For Foucault the thought of the outside “becomes a material energy, the 
suffering of the flesh” (2003, 426). It takes the form of non-dialectical negation; “not mind in 
laborious conquest of its unity, but the endless erosion of the outside” (2003, 427). Foucault 
reconciles the thought of the outside with the realm of consciousness by resorting to the concepts 
of attraction and negligence with reference to two emblematic figures, Ulysses and Orpheus. 
Behind the former’s triumphant narrative lingers a regret for not having listened longer to the 
Sirens. Behind the latter’s lament for Eurydice shines the glory of having seen, even for a 
moment, the unattainable face at the very instant of its return to darkness, “a nameless, placeless 
hymn to light” (2003, 435).   
 
This account compels us to consider how we might enfold our own experience of death into a 
non-masculine narrative characterised by the presence of the other. Narrative theorists who draw 
on Cavarero emphasise the folding and doubling nature of the narrative, in which story and 
repetition contains within itself the possibility of further repetitions (Watson 2008, 335). In that 
sense, the narrative is seen as inherently ambivalent, since the re-writing of the personal 
experience “occurs within the context of a narrative matrix that is itself structured like a 
narrative” (Watson 2008, 336). This double folded-ness and repetition chime with the sharing of 
traumas in Ettinger’s matrixial borderlinking. Ettinger approaches trauma not so much as an 
event in the past but from the point of view of its effective processing in the present, emphasising 
co-poiesis and working with other(s) who will “process traumatic events for me, like my 
m/Other processed archaic events for my premature and fragile subjectivity” (2006, 141). 
Ettinger further comments that in the matrixial encounter “I give myself over to an encounter 
with the Other, no more a subject in search for an object […] since what is opening from outside 
and unfolds my inside vacates both” (2006, 146, emphasis added). She also notes that trauma, 
not death, is the inherent co-efficient of subjectivity, a wounding of the matrixial web which 
“derives from the traumatic legacies of feminine sexual specificity inscribed in every born 
subject” (Pollock 2004, 52). Thus, the matrixial experience can generate dangerous encounters, 
and one may unexpectedly find oneself in proximity to an event, “as if you had always been 
potentially sliding on its margins” (Ettinger 2006, 148).  
 
A deficit of maternal trust can be traumatic and its unexpected return may constitute a dangerous 
encounter. The feeling of being rebuffed and chastised in our story merits further consideration. 
In Ettinger sharing with the (m)Other does not concern the satisfaction of one’s demand defined 
in psychoanalytic terms either as being given the object of one’s desire (Lacan) or obtaining 
access to the good mother (Klein). In fact, what one is offered in the matrixial experience is the 
very opposite, a movement that vacates both, a glimpse of absence experienced in a caring-
sharing context. In that sense, the Ettingerian (m)Other is neither just the Lacanian object a (we 
shall return to this point in detail later) nor the Kleinian good/bad object but a pre-symbolic 
relation reactivated in the present.  
 
In such an encounter the (m)Other is called to play a subtle role. Cavarero argues that mother is 
the name of an inclination towards the other (2016, 104), a unilateral response (2016, 106) and a 
predisposition to respond (2016, 105) to infantile vulnerability. The latter is understood as the 
originary paradigm of human vulnerability, arising again in any situation in which one may find 
oneself defenceless, in the position of the infant (2016, 104). This disposition, we argue, 
acquired in the pre-verbal presence of the mother and staying with us for life, entails that any 
appeal to the other in adult life may contain a plea to assuage a feeling of helplessness 
(hilflὄsigkeit) first experienced in relation to the mother. Thus, in sharing my story, I am neither 
Ulysses nor Orpheus, but a vulnerable child, appealing for her response and her inclination. My 
other is assigned a formidable task: to transform a deadly passion (the thought of my death,) 
arising from inside (psychic disposition) as well as outside, from the particulars of the narrative 
situation, which, unpredictable in its unfolding, gives rise to an anxiety I cannot anticipate or 
control.  
 
It might be prudent at this point to introduce a clear distinction between the verbal demand for a 
response addressed to the other (along the lines of “what is the meaning of my life?”) and the 
appeal for her inclination, taking into consideration the fact that both Cavarero’s postural 
proposal and Ettinger’s spatial conceptualisation of the matrixal are not delimited to language. 
Consider again the feeling of being rebuffed and chastised: it causes me to miss the fact that my 
friend suggests a different kind of trust, beyond my chagrin at not being trusted. My friend points 
at the dimension of care and responsibility (towards the other), taking my demand elsewhere. 
She does not “tell me off”. Instead of that, she takes up the thread of my aporia and splits it 
gently into two. While I appeal to her to satisfy my infantile demand for recognition and trust 
with the imaginary sameness of her own experience, she lets me down gently. In doing so, she 
tries to suture the gap of my aporia, speaking her own aporia, her own experience. Such 
moments of similarity-in-difference constitute occurrences of pure aporetic desire which invite 
both of us to witness each other’s inaccessible meaning. What is situated there is not just the 
memory of raising a daughter so as to be (sexually) prudent, but the range of the possible effects 
maternal care may have had on my entire life. This is the red (biographical) thread and the stork I 
cannot follow. Beyond the appeal to my friend to provide me with the details of her life, I think I 
seek something more visceral (and pre-verbal), something that requires a response beyond 
(phallic) interpretation. And it is in this context that it would make sense to clearly hold in mind 
the difference between the verbal demand for a response addressed to the other from the appeal 
for her inclination enfolded in the same gesture.  
 
For Cavarero the design of our lives can only be seen when one looks back, with the figural unity 
of the design resulting and not following from a plan (2000, 1, emphasis added). This 
retrospective appearance, this end-beginning of meaning, carries the past in the present 
demanding (a) meaning. If we accept that a narrative always reads backwards (Watson 2008, 
334), we must also accept that backwards admits a break in time and continuity. Looking back, I 
see myself as I once was, a vulnerable child. The act of looking back makes me both the 
spectator and the actor of my own scene. Thus, instead of saying “I remember the past”, it might 
be more accurate to say that ‘the past remembers me’ in the afterwardness (nachträglichkeit) of 
the reactivated memory traces (Fletcher 2013, 69). Looking back, what the child did not once 
understand returns, decades later, as aporia and a lack of recognition. Naively, verbally, I am 
looking for an easy exchange of non-meaning (aporia) for meaning (a design for life). Any 
interpretation provided by the other could address this latter demand but would fall short of the 
true matrixial qualities which lie in the realm of inclination. If that is the case, we must ask: at 
which moment does a gesture of inclination or leaning towards the other make sense, and how 
does it support the desire for unity and recognition? How does the other help me at that very 
point, being in aporia as much as I am? 
 
Second Rotation: Dissymmetry, Embrace  
 
In order to answer these questions we start from Cavarero’s concept of maternal inclination as a 
structurally asymmetrical relationship with the infant (2016, 106), and, more precisely, as a 
posture that is ‘relational, originary, asymmetrical, and capable of evoking common vulnerability 
(2016, 127). Cavarero’s theorization reconfigures Arendt’s <5> concept of natality in such a way 
as to address the ‘inhuman loneliness’ arising from the scene. A similar loneliness, we argue, 
permeates Freudian and Lacanian analysis. By rethinking the importance of the maternal 
presence, Cavarero and Ettinger honor and exceed the theoretical postulates that underpin their 
work whilst shifting the emphasis from death to life and from the end to the beginning. This shift 
is not at all incompatible with the drive as conceptualized by Laplanche in Life and Death in 
Psychoanalysis (1985).  
 
In discussing the significance of birth as a philosophical principle, Cavarero acknowledges the 
importance of Arendt’s concept of natality (2016, 113), before observing that the infant does not 
interest Arendt beyond the inaugural moment of birth. The Arendtian newborn, Cavarero 
remarks, evokes inhuman loneliness (2016, 120). Thus, the Italian philosopher makes it her task 
to introduce the mother into the scene of natality, predicting that such an insertion would fracture 
the scene’s fundamental logical structure (2016, 120). Upon being inserted in the scene, she 
adds, the mother introduces an asymmetrical relationship to the infant’s vulnerability (2016, 
122).  
 
The concept of asymmetry permeates the mother-child relationship in Freudian psychoanalysis. 
Freud does not dismiss the mother. On the contrary, he accentuates the dissymmetry between the 
mother and the infant, accepting that the former’s omnipotence “has a decisive influence on the 
structuring of the psyche” (Laplanche and Pontalis 1988, 190). However, Freud assumes that 
such a state of dependence is frustrating for the infant, resulting in a feeling of helplessness 
(hilflὄsigkeit) and an increasing tension “which the psychic apparatus is as yet unable to control” 
(Laplanche and Pontalis 1988, 189).  
 
In the natality scene, the advent of the infant makes its own unique contribution, interrupting the 
natural cycle’ monotony, “a miracle that pertains to the dimension of immanence and 
contingency” (2016, 112). Natality, adds Cavarero, “not only supplants the inexorability of death 
with the unpredictability of beginning, it also breaks with every automatism, so that the 
individual life can no longer be though as a straight line running to ruin” (2016, 112). The 
inaugural qualities of the asymmetry in the maternal scene challenge the infant’s frustration as 
envisaged by Freud, offering a blueprint of a relationship grounded in difference, not in 
narcissistic duality. At the same time, predictability, automatism and the straight line to ruin do 
not sound dissimilar to the psychoanalytic repetition compulsion qua inexorable move of the 
death drive. In that sense, mother and child help one another both out of narcissism and out of 
the death drive. But how does this inaugural relationship and the break of automatism translate 
into a caring practice between adults in a scene like the one discussed here? This is where we 
need to evoke another fundamental dissymmetry, namely, between life and death as discussed by 
Laplanche in Life and Death in Psychoanalysis. In order to do so, we must take a brief detour 
through the concepts of the signifier and the Other.  
 
In Lacanian terms, the appeal to the Other and the attack of ignorance about the meaning of 
one’s life (lack of knowledge, bodily inertia) can be considered as a hysterical demand which 
reverberates with nostos (homesickness), the desire for a return to the same (Gerber, 2014) via an 
“accidental” repetition. Our own experience as immigrants and our nostos echoes with the 
enduring and complex effects migration has upon the human psyche often examined in terms of 
trauma or mourning <6>. An encounter with this doubly determined failed temporality disturbs 
and surprises (Guzman, 2014, 240). At this point Lacanian psychoanalysis proposes the 
following solution:  Our socio-historical determination by the parameters of our own time entail 
that the speaking subject tells what has been decided by the structure (Pavon-Cuéllar, 2014, 69) 
and does the work of the signifying social structure. In that sense, it can either try, once again, to 
credit the Other with a wealth of knowledge and explanatory power, or to “break ranks” with the 
Other establishing itself as an exception. In this process “the act fixes a point of reference for the 
subject” (Negro, 2014, 107), allowing her to go beyond the limits of her hysterical demand.  
 The above formulation is characterised by an inhuman loneliness similar to the one we find in 
Cavarero’s commentary, the loneliness of the subject facing the void of its constitutive relation 
with the Other. Can we deviate from this formulation, opening up the space beyond seeking 
hysterical affirmation in the Other and beyond being immersed in psychoanalytically conceived 
inhuman loneliness? Both Cavarero and Ettinger seem to envisage an intersubjective relation that 
does not replicate the subject who ploughs their solitary way through the vagaries of lack. So 
here lies a basic philosophical dissymmetry between me and the (m)other’: as I fail to see the 
design of my life, I swoon and die at the closure (looping around of the death drive) that forms 
the limit of my narrative memory, begging, body and soul, for the pattern of a stork (2000, 3). 
The other cannot offer me the answer I crave, as she is equally ignorant of it, but can ‘hold’ me, 
in her propping embrace, at the point the adult-me experiences death and helplessness 
(hilflὄsigkeit) as rigidity of form. My friend does not offer me the pattern of a stork but the 
curvature of space (embrace) and the repetition of a primary maternal gesture, not-death.  
 
The Lacanian emphasis on lack and language (the signifier) often veils the power of gesture. At 
times, it also veils the irreducible difference of life and death and the fact that they cannot be 
exchanged like signifiers. The non-exchange of life and death inhabits Laplanche’s work. The 
two are radically different but may co-exist as drives, propping or leaning onto one another as 
unity and disunity, Eros and conflict.  Laplanche describes this leaning not as a moment or a 
fixed point of reference but as a scene  which holds together, in formal unity, several ideas that 
are related but not identical, further calling it, after Lagache, a virtual monster, like a chimeras, 
or a dragon of body parts (Laplanche 1985, 108). <7>  
 Such a scene allows something important to emerge: not the death drive materializing in the field 
of sexuality as masochism and sadism <8>, but unity and the possibility for an (inaugural) 
affirmation of being that lies beyond the (impossible) knowledge of the Other. In that sense, my 
other offers me what Deleuze would call a disjunctive conjunction (of life and death), no 
concrete object and no interpretation, but an object-less interpretation, the only one she can 
credibly afford. Maternal inclination sends back to me, in fracturing dissymmetry, the death 
drive, not as a compulsion to repeat but as the pure curving movement of an embrace. Only the 
presence of another human being can do that. Might it be a step too far to propose that this 
conceptualization of the drive approximates the Cavarerian maternal inclination “understood as a 
posture that is relational, originary, asymmetrical, and capable of evoking common 
vulnerability” (2016, 127)? One could further argue that the (m)other in the relational scene 
addresses my aporia in a gestural/postural manner by transforming it into a diverting movement 
which un-freezes (self)aggressive immobilization (bodily inertia). This can be an inaugural 
moment only when it addresses a limit condition, such as a traumatic and dangerous encounter, 
not just any demand for a story or a tale.  
 
We find a visual parallel in Fletcher’s (2013) discussion of da Vinci’s The Virgin and Child with 
St Anne, the same painting Cavarero places at the center of her postural ethics. Fletcher reads the 
painting as a scene of containment, drawing attention to Mary’s posture and extended arm 
towards the infant, as well as the child’s rough handling of a baby lamb at the corner of the 
painting. The author argues that containment is located in the outstretched gesture, which is not 
just an attempt to repossess the errant child but which intervenes in the child’s rather violent 
stranglehold of the unfortunate animal (2013, 202). Fletcher adds that the eruption of violence 
and aggression at the corner of the picture “testifies to the continuing need for maternal holding 
and containment of the unruly impulses, a containment that is implemented through the seductive 
power of the smiling gaze of the mother that draws the child’s return gaze back to her even as he 
eludes her grasp”’ (2013, 202).  
 
We do not concur with the argument about the seductive gaze. My friend, my other who processes 
my anguish, does not seduce me. As Ettinger would argue, she is co-affected. Inclination and the 
extended arm posit a primary gesture, enacting the circularity of the drive, the first and constant 
response of life and unity which reins in the conflict (disunity) of the death drive. The gesture of 
the embrace enfolds death (drive) into the matrixial space.  It constitutes an inaugural moment 
which breaks the automatism of repetition qua return of the same (aporia, death). The one who 
enters the (inhuman) scene of loneliness, the (m)other, the friend who puts her hand around my 
shoulder, inaugurates a new beginning, a moment which cancels death and breaks the straight line 
of automatism, my headlong rush to the somatic and cultural intimation of death (rigidity of form, 
hysteria). Fletcher considers that to be a quality of the mother. Cavarero attributes it to the child. 
Ettinger affords us a glimpse of a spatiotemporal matrixial arrangement in which one can be both, 
a non-I, fading-in-transformation (2006, 141).  
 
 
Third Rotation: Metramorphosis and a Random Event  
 
In Lacanian terms an experience of helplessness like the one we are discussing here could be 
described as an event or an eruption of the Real, affording a glimpse of the thing (das Ding) that 
cannot be said but lies at the core of our experience (Frosh 2014, 21). Lacanian psychoanalysis 
values such disruptions as revealing the truth of the speaking subject and its constitutive lack, 
paying little attention to either the interlocutor, in whose presence the thing is intimated, or the 
interplay between disruption and movement. Moreover, unity and union have no place in 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, hailing, as they do, from the Imaginary which obscures the truth of the 
subject. A rotation of the prism in the direction of the Cavarerian inclination as part of an 
alternative geometry allows us to (further) problematize this view. This bears directly to 
Ettinger’s conceptualization of the matrixial, some aspects of which already diverge from 
Lacanian psychoanalysis.  
 
In his insightful discussion of Ettinger’s work, Neill argues that she preserves the concept of lack 
in so far as desire cannot operate without it (2008, 333), adding that: “without dismissing this 
logic, Ettinger seeks to supplement it with another logic, another type of phantasy” (2008, 333, 
emphasis added), one that functions in parallel to the object a (the missing object of lack) 
without replacing or contesting it (ibid). Following this interpretation, we could surmise that my 
other offers me a phantasy<9>, one that can presumably pacify me but will ultimately fail to 
address my inherent lack. While we agree that lack is a fundamental concept, and union with the 
mother is imaginary and, as shown in the previous section, essentially untenable, taking phantasy 
as the sole outcome of the matrixial encounter jars with Ettinger’s key concept of 
metramorphosis <10> as “an originary human potentiality for reciprocal yet asymmetrical 
crossing of borderlines between I and the non-I” (2006b, 221, emphasis added). What is the 
value of metramorphosis if everything is ultimately subsumed by phantasy?  
 
An event, argues Parker, cannot be neutralized or reduced to structure (2014, 8). More to the 
point, an event constitutes a special place of articulation between continuity and rupture, or 
history and novelty (119), a point of crossing (traversal) in which “something new and the 
unheard-of may eventually emerge” (Bosteels 2003, 123). According to Bosteels, when 
considering the emergence of an event, it is prudent to examine its environs, in order to 
appreciate its radical character and its haphazard nature without losing track of its structural 
overdetermination (Bosteels 2003, 120). In the clinical setting, the act of interpretation can be 
such an event, since it constitutes the junction between what already exists in language 
(symptom) and what is about to emerge, that is, the missing element (cause) which supports and 
structures the symptom. A similar principle applies to historical and spatially located events. 
Bosteels cites the example of the May ’68 protests in Paris as a radical event arising out of the 
horizon of political agitation. Here, the emphasis is not on verbal interpretation but on the break 
with the norm. In trying to conceptualize such a unique locus, Jacques Alain Miller calls for a 
change in our perspective, one that will allow us to see “space pivot on its axis and, by a 
complete rotation that accomplishes its division, discover the inner rule of its law and the order 
that secretly adjusts whatever is offered up to the gaze” (Bosteels 2003, 129). This decisive 
rotation, he adds, undoes the structure of the symptom, allowing for a traversal or a “diagonal 
reading” (Bosteels 2003, 129, emphasis added).  
 
Miller’s visual metaphor chimes with Cavarero’s and Ettinger’s, despite remaining squarely 
geometrical and ensconced in Lacanian psychoanalytic orthodoxy. Nevertheless, it marks the 
place at which symptom and, by extension, phantasy as an imaginary formation, come to pass as 
no longer tenable. A diagonal move, we could therefore argue, rotates both gaze and space 
towards the (curved) motion of the new and the unexpected and lends itself to the maternal and 
the matrixial. This rotation does not veil, placate or pacify like the phantasy. It grounds me in a 
trajectory that departs from me and comes back to me from the other, just as my bodily inertia, 
the acting out of helplessness, registers the tension between life and death, knowledge and non-
knowledge, response and aporia. To privilege phantasy as the answer to such an experience falls 
short of Ettinger’s key concept of metramorphosis as a special connection between analytical 
practice as an ethical working-through and artistic practice as an aesthetical working-through, 
especially since working-through encompasses “the psychical work which allows the subject to 
accept certain repressed elements and to free himself from the grip of mechanisms of repetition” 
(Laplanche and Pontalis 1988, 488). Of course an encounter with friends is not a clinical 
situation and does not culminate in formal interpretation. Ettinger, however, takes great pains to 
preserve something of the ethically important crossing which the term working-through 
inherently implies. It would seem plausible to propose, then, that metramorphosis chimes with 
Cavarero’s concept on natality in its relational maternal qualities. It provides the space and 
relational perspective for something other than death to break into the scene.  
 
Fourth Rotation: Maternal Clinamen  
 
Inclination (clinamen) is a rather contested concept in Lacanian psychoanalysis. Lacan uses the 
term in the Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (1973) but does not seem to come 
back to it in other writings. Mladen Dolar revisits the term in 2013 in an article entitled “Tyche, 
clinamen, den” (2013). Dolar argues that Lacanian psychoanalysis does not need the concept of 
clinamen. Dolar’s discussion draws on the philosophical definition of “one” and the indivisibility 
of the atom in pre-Socratic philosophy. Once again, the argument makes perfect sense within the 
remit of psychoanalysis but a more careful reading of the original Lacanian text reveals 
something else, namely, the elision of the mother from the scene, the one who must be excised in 
order for the logic of psychoanalysis to be configured. We trace the unfolding of the argument 
from Dolar to Lacan, holding in mind Cavarero’s proposition that the advent of the mother 
fractures the scene of inhuman loneliness.  
 
Caverero argues that inclination (clinamen) is chance which disrupts the automatism of repetition 
(2016, 96), throwing things off kilt, in a new direction. Lacan differentiates between the 
automatism of repetition (automaton) and tyche (chance) as inclination (clinamen). The former 
pertains to the symbolic and the tendency to repeat the pleasurable, the latter to the register of a 
chance encounter with the real. The two exist intertwined: “Tyche only dwells in the gaps of the 
automaton. In the tiny gap between one occurrence and the next one, something is produced that 
is irreducible to automaton” (Dolar 2013, 228). Dolar addresses the question of whether 
clinamen can be considered a properly Lacanian concept, starting his argument with the 
properties of the atom (literally ‘that which cannot be divided’) in pre-Socratic philosophy. 
Clinamen (qua unpredictable change of course), in this context, concerns  
 
not merely the fate of the universe which is at stake, but the fate of our own will and 
passion, desire and enjoyment—actually not the fate, but quite the opposite, the very 
possibility of breaking the fate. Clinamen is at the point where cosmos and humanity 
overlap, the out-of-place and out-of-time point they share (229).   
 
Dolar is concerned with a specific issue, namely, whether clinamen belongs to the immanent 
properties of the atom or not:   
It [clinamen] can be either situated in the place of (constitutive) exception, something that 
must always already have happened in order for the universe to emerge, occurring out-of-
space and out of-time with no place nor moment within space and time once they are 
constituted. Or else it can be an omnipresent ‘universal’ principle which immanently 
derails any given one at all places and all times (232-4).  
 
Badiou opts for the first, while Deleuze, Derrida and Maillassoux accept it as an originary 
determinant of movement in the atom (2013, 233). Dolar asks if there is a third option, other than 
having to decide between an exception that never takes place although it underlies every taking 
place, and an out-of-worldly immanent transcendence 'quasi-universalizing the exception to 
make it immanent and thus turn it to ‘a universal swerviness of any universal, the out-of-oneness 
of any One (with the danger of providing a convenient and non-binding passe-partout)’ (2013, 
233). Dolar also considers the Lacanian-ness of the concept of clinamen in terms of thinking 
together the One and the Other’ (2013, 233) via the determination of One in Aristotle. The third 
option is provided by the Ancient Greek negative grammatical particle den (non) which is “not 
something, not nothing, not being, not one, not positively existing, not absent, not countable”, 
subsequently identified by Dolar as “not precisely the object”, in other words, the object a (2013, 
235). Thus, by displacing the choice between exception and immanence onto the notion of the 
non-object, Dolar neatly solves the problem of the clinamen, rescuing Lacan from veering off to 
the margins of theoretical orthodoxy: “If atom is den, then for Democritus it can have no weight, 
and there can be neither parallel fall nor the problem of clinamen” (2013, 236).  
This further allows Dolar to argue that we can now avoid positing clinamen as either a 
foundational exception (Badiou) or a universalized virtuality (Deleuze). At the same time, this 
alternative maintains both parts, one and den, as the very cleft of being, the place where both 
being and thought (e)merge. At best, then, clinamen can be thought as the locus of an either/or 
theoretical choice:  
There seems to be like a parallax view when looking at the atom: either one sees the split, 
one/void etc., as Hegel did, or else one sees clinamen, the inner swerviness, torsion, 
declination, the immanent becoming not premised on the cut of negativity, relying on 
swerviness as the becoming without a void’ (238).  
At worse, clinamen inhabits the Lacanian text almost as a theoretical weakness, which the 
superimposition of the den corrects in exemplary fashion.  
What does this have to do with the (m)other? A more careful reading of Lacan’s text is quite 
revealing. Lacan discusses the concept of clinamen in the context of the repetition inherent in the 
fort/da game with which the child attempts to represent the presence/absence of the mother in 
Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Lacan notes that the reel with which the child plays the 
game acts like an object a and part of himself with which the child identifies in the game of 
repetition and the splitting between Vosterllung and Repräsentanz (1991, 63). In the next 
paragraph, Lacan offers a personal testimony of a child’s effort to deal with maternal presence 
and absence and, by extension, the early intimations of death:  
I, too, have seen with my own eyes, opened by maternal divination, the child, traumatized 
by the fact that I was going away despite the appeal, preciously adumbrated in his voice, 
and henceforth more renewed for months at a time – long after, having picked up this 
child – I have seen it let his head fall on my shoulder and drop off to sleep, sleep alone 
being capable of giving him access to the living signifier that I has become since the date 
of the trauma (63).  
In this paragraph it is evident that Lacan fails to include himself as human presence in the scene, 
turning a blind eye to what he offers the child – a disposition, an inclination, an embrace – and 
the reciprocity between this inclination and the break of automatism which the child returns to 
him.  Needless to add, in this very moment of blindness, he excises the (m)other from the scene. 
Dolar reinstalls this blind spot of psychoanalytic reasoning further shifting the emphasis from 
sleep (the inertia of the body) and lack to not-one, once again burying the (m)other under the 
debris of the object a. 
The (re)introduction of the mother fractures the psychoanalytic scene with a gesture of curvature 
and the possibility of a beginning, just as the readmission of inclination as immanent property 
disturbs psychoanalytic logic. Both Ettinger and Cavarero use the term disposition in their 
writings. Can we accept disposition or human propensity without incurring the risk of naïve 
essentialism or biologism (see Cavarero 2016, 103)? A feminist rotation of the phallic prism 
allows us to re-emplace disposition in our vocabulary and further weaken the prevalence of lack. 
Taking this argument to its theoretical limit, we would further suggest that the Ettingerian theory 
of matrixial borderlinking must be further developed so as to move more decisively away from 
the biding properties of lack. Lack is simply not all. By shifting our gaze away from the object a 
we return to the duality of Eros and Thanatos. When I have experienced conflict (non-unity in 
the sense of the death drive) in the presence of the other, a new beginning does not merely fall 
back on lack but constitutes a co-emergence, or an emergence of the union of Eros. Laplanche 
posit Eros as the primary moving force behind the scene of representation. Eros and the vital 
order, not Thanatos, as primary force seeks “to maintain, preserve and augment the cohesion and 
the synthetic tendency of the living beings and of psychic life” (Laplanche, 1985, 123). Lyotard 
privileges Eros as the moving force of libidinal economy employing (Bennington 1988, 24). 
Likewise, synthesis and co-poiesis cannot be excised from feminist psychoanalytic philosophy 
without arbitrarily privileging Thanatos.  
 
Towards Movement  
 
Cavarero notes that postural philosophy can exist alongside existing masculine philosophical 
formulations not in order to deny the vertical model but to expose its limits (2016, 127). If that is 
the case, could we further elaborate on their possible relation, especially if we wish to argue that 
maternal inclination and matrixial borderlinking as human dispositions should be accepted as 
equal to the fundamental concepts of masculine philosophy and psychoanalysis?  
 
Cavarero argues that postural geometry “far from limiting itself to the axis of uprightness, 
arranges the human along multiple coexisting lines, which may be contingent and intermittent, 
and at times even random” (2016, 129). Let us be reminded of Etttinger’s comparable matrixial 
topology of jouissance, traumas, pictograms, phantasies, affects, death-drive oscillations, 
libidinal-erotic flows, imprints and affected traces (2000, 195). When we explore the response to 
an experience of death, dis-unity and helplessness, successive rotations reveal that this occurs 
along multiple lines. This allows us to propose movement as a live extension of inclination and 
co-poetic spatiality, and as an indispensable component of feminist ontology. To quip in analytic 
language, woman’s counterpart is neither the phallus nor object a, but sharing and movement. 
This, we argue best captures the im-materiality of sharing in the matrixial scene which, once 
again, exceeds the limitations of the missing object:  
 
If it is not possible to distinguish between the Thing in and for myself and the Thing in and 
for the other, then what we are left with are traces of links which can only be witnessed in 
a togetherness that is not reducible to union, insofar as a union, a unity, would suggest a 
comprehension, a totality and closure (Neil 2008, 337). 
 
But what happens when we place the movement of unity and disunity at the heart of our 
perspective? Cavarero notes that the movement of relationality underpins the primary scene of 
birth (2016, 99), and Ettinger understands matrixial borderlinking as “an astatic process [….] 
governed less by mastery, accumulation and the gaze than is by touching, hearing and 
movement” (Neill 2008, 332). Movement can be the curvature of space, as opposed to linearity 
or even afterwardness (nachträglichkeit), an inclination which inscribes the leaning of death onto 
life into a trajectory of dissymmetries in the maternal/matrixial scene. As Cavarero proposes: 
“Inclination can become the module that composes the picture’s design – its leitmotif or 
prevailing posture” (2016, 128).  
 
In a Deleuzian reading of Ettinger’s work, Barrett, approaches the matrixial as a locus which 
com-poses intensities, flows and linkages that can accommodate chance and unpredictability in 
creative processes which do not always originate in decision or will <11> (Barrett 2000, 254, 
257). Barrett considers Ettinger’s work as providing an anoedipal non-phallic organisation, “an 
alternative dimension of subjectivization, inhabited by affects, intensities and moments of 
transgression, which ‘indicate the essentially nomadic, excessive and a-signifying dimensions of 
textual practices” (2000, 256). Developing her argument in the realm of the visual arts, Barrett 
suggest that the Ettingerian matrixial “permits us to identify the articulatory affects which shift 
the system towards the drive-governed basis of visual production.  […] There moments mark 
nomadic movements away from the signifying structure of the text and relate to traces of 
beyond-the-phallus part of object a/s caught up in the artwork” (2000, 258).  
 
Drawing on this formulation, and deliberately turning a blind eye to the forced choice between 
Lacanian psychoanalysis and Deleuze often put forward in similar cases, we propose that the 
organisation of desire after the model of lack (and Thing, object a) and its alternative inscription 
in a matrixial/inclinational register might relate to one another as plane of organization to plane 
of consistency in Deleuzian philosophy (see Barrett 2000, 258). The two planes do not compete 
with or cancel each other out but constitute alternative geometries. Deleuze and Guattari describe 
the plane of organisation (or development) as structural or genetic; a hidden structure necessary 
for forms, a teleological plan(e), a design and mental principle (2008, 293). The plane of 
consistency (or composition), on the other hand, is permeated by ‘relations of movement and 
rest, speed and slowness between unformed elements, or at lease elements that are relatively 
unformed, molecules and particles of all kinds. […] Nothing subjectifies, but haecceities form 
according to compositions of nonsubjectified powers or affects’ (294). This geometrical plane is 
not tied to a mental design but to an abstract design, in which ‘form is constantly being 
dissolved, freeing time and space’ (294).  
 
Adding maternal inclination qua sharing and embrace to the scene of verbal exchange, marks a 
departure from and a disruption of the plane of organisation; it causes the drive qua movement 
and impossible exchange between life and death to veer off, to lean on, to take a different 
direction, to cease to disrupt when contained in the looping motion of an embrace. Movement, 
then, becomes the material wedge between Eros and Thanatos as condition of appearance in the 
anti-vertical, matrixial assemblage. The latter arises when life problematizes itself, as Foucault 
would put it (Rajchman, 1991), giving rise to the new and the unexpected. Maternal inclination 
as a module of a disruptive and revolutionary geometry (Cavarero 2016, 131) allows one to start 
in the beginning, where there was vulnerability and embrace.  
 
Notes  
1. Metra-morphosis is a neologism comprising of ‘metamorphosis’ and ‘metra’ (Greek for uterus). 
It signifies transformation-in-difference and harks back to unity-in-difference between the mother 
and the foetus as a relationship of difference anterior to the (narcissistic) mother-child pair in 
Freudian psychoanalysis. 
2. Laplanche and Pontalis define the Freudian drive (or instinct) in terms of its source in a bodily 
stimulus; its aim, which is to eliminate the state of tension at the source; and its object thanks to 
which the instinct may achieve its aim (1988, 214). Lacan emphasises the trajectory of the drive. 
Hailing from the erogenous zones of the body (eyes, mouth, the anus, the drive follows a circular 
outwards and backwards trajectory, the aim of which is to gain satisfaction by reaching out to an 
object (object a) which remains unattainable. Thus, the drive is a loop around an elusive object 
which repeats itself. As a constant force it appears meaningless from the point of view of 
organised social life (Lacan, 1991, 163). 
3. Kingsbury writes: ‘The important point to make here is that any activity has the potential to 
turn into the gyre of the drives, insofar as the activity brings to the fore the extent to which 
people can achieve satisfaction by not achieving their aims: by not finding an empty chair, by 
waiting and waiting and waiting for that final magic number to be called out’ (2010, 529). 
4. Foucault’s “The thought of the outside” (2003) focuses on the negotiation of meaning at the 
margins of language and experience.  
5. In Arendt natality is ‘the second birth’ through which we appear in the world as political 
subjects: 
This insertion is not forced upon us by necessity, like labor, and it is not prompted by 
utility like work. It may be stimulated by the presence of others whose company we may 
wish to join, but it is never conditioned by them; its impulse springs from the beginning 
which came into the world when we were born and to which we respond by beginning 
something new on our own initiative. (Arendt 1998, 176-77).   
6. See, for example, Hollander, 2006; Honig, 1997; Tummala-Narra 2014; Beltsiou. The 
experience of race could also be relevant to our discussion but beyond the remit of the present 
paper. which focuses on the maternal-matrixial rethinking the masculine psychoanalytic model. 
As a way of problematizing the masculine model, as well as reflecting upon one’s elision from 
the present, our paper would chime with Moten’s Stolen Life (2018) but seen as a private, not a 
public way of rethinking visibility/invisibility.  
7. Ettinger does not make any direct reference to Laplanche’s work but echoes this 
scattering/unifying scene when referring to the internal excitation and the ‘fantasmatic 
arrangement – of several representative elements linked together in a short scene, an extremely 
rudimentary scene, ultimately composed of partial objects […] is immediately relived as real’ 
(2006: 61, emphasis added). 
8. See, for example, Williams, 1985; de Lauretis, 2008.  
9. We are not referring to the intra-uterine phantasy that Ettinger enfolds into the process of 
becoming-mother (see Smith 2013) but phantasy as the only outcome of a process of traversal.   
10. Metra-morphosis refers to the uterus (metra) and the unity-in-difference between the mother 
and the foetus qua relationship of difference anterior to the mother-child duality and narcissism 
of Freudian psychoanalysis.  
11. For the more recent attempt at finding common ground between Deleuze and Lacan see 
Nedoh and Zevnik 2018.  
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